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1 Introduction
Coordination is the regulation of diverse elements of a system into an inte-
grated and harmonious operation. Coordination is thus the act of arrang-
ing, putting things in order, or making things run smoothly together. In
many settings, the price system can effectively coordinate economic activi-
ties. However, there are many instances, e.g., when there are few players,
when the information is not complete, etc., in which the market system can-
not work properly and other means emerge to coordinate economic activities,
as other contributions in this special issue show.
In this paper, we are interested in a special type of coordination, based on
collective reputation, in which otherwise independent firms share a common
(regional or else) brand. Reputation has long been recognized as a mar-
ket force that may ensure contractual performance (Klein and Leﬄer, 1981).
When information on some traits or behaviors of the parties involved in a
transaction is missing, repeated transactions and the emergence of reputation
may correct market failures that would emerge in one-shot interactions. Indi-
vidual reputations, that is the reputation emerging for individual agents fol-
lowing their behavior, have long been studied and the literature is now quite
large (for an introductory survey see, for example, Bar-Isaac and Tadelis,
2008). The literature on collective reputation, on the other hand, is rather
limited in general (for a seminal contribution see Tirole, 1996) and even more
so for the agricultural sector, where there are indeed many instances in which
producers share a common brand.
In Europe, probably the most well-know examples of collective repu-
tations in the agricultural sector are the protected designations of origins
(PDO) wines (formerly known as Appellation d’Origine Controˆlle´e, or AOC).1
PDOs, together with protected geographical indications (PGIs), are the back-
bone of the geographical indications (GIs) system by which the EU regulator
has instituzionalized the link between the quality attributes of a good to
the geographic location in which production takes place, i.e., to the terroir.
Bordeaux, Champagne, Chianti are some of the typical instances: wine pro-
ducers in those regions can sell their product - when produced respecting
some shared rules, i.e., cahier des charges, - using the name of the region
to make their product more recognizable and possibly benefit from a better
reputation.
PDO wines may be the best known cases, but there are many examples
in other food industries, for instance Camembert or Parmiggiano Reggiano
1Since the EU Reg. 479/2008, the different national AOC regulations on wines have
been harmonised across all EU member states and now they are referred as protected
designations of origins (PDOs) wines.
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cheeses, Parma’s ham, Somerset Cider Brandy, etc. Historically, there is evi-
dence that high quality agricultural products of specific areas were associated
with geographical names since the 4th century BC (Bertozzi, 1995). These
regional brands allow agricultural products to be more easily recognized by
consumers, and in many cases ensure higher prices and returns to firms. For
these reasons, there is public recognition and support for these collective
endeavors by agricultural firms in many countries.2
But collective reputation is not only regional brands. The members that
deliver their milk to a cooperative’s processing facilites share to a greater or
lesser extent collective reputation. Membership into the Label Rouge label
is another of numerous instances. All these firms benefit from a shared
reputation, but also risk from actions undertaken by other firms associated
with the collective brand that may finally affect their economic well-being.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we discuss the functioning
of these collective brands, in particular the interactions among the firms that
form and manage them, and we highlight some of the relevant problems of
collective reputation in agricultural markets. The law usually grants a group
of firms (or agricultural producers) the authority to manage the functioning
of the collective brand: the group can decide on who can join it, on the pro-
duction rules and their monitoring/enforcement, on who should be possibly
expelled in case of violation, etc.
Thus the PDO is owned and managed by the group on a democratic ba-
sis. However, firms within collective brand can be heterogeneous, thus with
different incentives and different payoffs following the seizing of the market
opportunities that the collective endeavor may permit. Seizing these market
opportunites often lead to choices that have differential impacts on mem-
bers, with some that are eager to seize these opportunities and others that
are reluctant, possibly afraid that these choices may damage the reputation
itself. We will illustrate some of these recent conflicts among members and
controversial choices that ensued, either by the group managing the PDO
or by some members that disagree with the majority’s decisions. Some of
these controversial choices even reached the media, witnessing the different
positions and interests within these groups.
We look at the problems for the industry, describing some recent cases,
but we also consider some of the questions that policy-makers may face in this
area, in particular which governance or hierarchical structure of the collec-
2At the EU level, see the original reg. no. 2081/1992 and successive modifications (the
last is reg. no. 1151/2012 for protected designation of origin (PDO) and protected geo-
graphical indication (PGI)). In 2010, there were 872 agricultural products protected with
EU geographical indications (excluding wines), for a total sales value of almost 16 billions
of euro (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/schemes/index_en.htm).
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tive reputation system, such as a geographical indication, may be designed
to resolve or reduce conflicts among different interests, that is to possibly
align their interests. We thus compare some examples of different PDOs,
highlighting some of the issues that emerge and that may warrant further
investigation.
The second objective of the paper is thus to suggest some venues for
research that could help in designing better policies for collective reputa-
tions. After briefly reviewing the literature on individual reputation,3 we
discuss collective reputation using recent developments in the economics of
reputation, a vast and growing literature that can be distinguished - in a
very rough and arbitrary division - between models of imitation (i.e., the low
quality type would like to be confused with the high quality type) and of
separation, when the good type does not want to be confused with the bad
type (Bar-Isaac and Tadelis, 2008).
We discuss some aspects of the problems emerging from recent controver-
sies that involve firms belonging to collective brands, and we illustrate some
other cases that share some of the main features explained above. We will
argue that some of the problems highlighted in the paper have not been yet
thoroughly analyzed, in particular the democratic-decision process and the
heterogeneity across firms. We finally highlight some questions that would
deserve investigation for policy-making purposes and conclude the paper.
2 On the literature on reputation
There are many situations in which consumers may be uncertain about the
quality of a good until after consumption, as is the case of experience goods
(Nelson, 1970), and asymmetric information may lead to market failures
(Akerlof, 1970). Different market solutions may emerge to mitigate these
failures, and reputation has been recognized as an effective means (Klein
and Leﬄer, 1981). When a consumer cannot observe some of the quality
attributes of a good or service before consumption, she may rely on a firm’s
reputation4, that is on her beliefs about the quality that can be associated
with that firm’s product.
The buyer indeed can gather information and form her beliefs from dif-
ferent sources, such as direct observations of the seller’s past performance,
3In this paper we do not consider the literature on geographical indications, since most
of it does not rely on models of reputation. Moreover, we review only published papers,
i.e., no working papers, with an exception.
4Here we consider firms’ reputation, but the analysis can be extented to any seller or
economic agent.
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experience with other firms, reports from other parties (e.g., word of mouth),
and others. There are different ways to model reputation and in recent years
many contributions, both theorethical and empirical, have been published.
2.1 Individual reputation
If we focus on the information provided by past transactions, we can distin-
guish between three broad classes of models for individual reputation: hidden
information, hidden action, and mixed models (Bar-Isaac and Tadelis, 2008).5
In “pure hidden information” models, the seller has not active role in
influencing the outcome of a transaction, but the quality of the good de-
pends however on the seller characteristics (type). In this class of models,
reputation is modeled as the consumer’s beliefs on the firm’s type. Beliefs
are generally modeled as (posterior) probabilities, and the updating of the
beliefs (following Bayes’ law) is based on the success or failure of the good,
i.e., the personal history of the firm. Reputation is thus modeled as the
“pure learning” of the seller’s type, which is considered an undelying truth,
not manipulable and that can be learnt using past performance.
In pure “hidden action” models, the firm can be of a unique type, but the
uncertainty on quality depends on the firm’s equilibrium behavior. In other
words, firm’s quality depends on its actions and the reputation is modeled
as the beliefs that the consumer has regarding firm’s equilibrium behavior.
In this class of models, the repeated nature of the transaction allows for
reputation to establish and for punishment to be used in case of deviations.
The “carrot and stick” approach induces firms to balance the short-run in-
centive to shirk on quality against the long-run risk of losing the business
opportunities.
In “mixed” models, possibly the more realistic class, the quality of the
good depends both on the type and on the actions of the seller. Reputation
is thus represented by the buyer’s beliefs on the type of seller and on the
anticipated equilibrium behavior of different types. When the seller knows
her type, i.e., in signalling models, there are usually (at least) two types: one
type of firm, the strategic or opportunistic kind, who may decide whether to
produce high or low quality; the other, the commitment type, who always
choose the same quality level.
Mixed models can then be distinguished in two sub-classes. In the imi-
tation models, the commitment type always produce high quality, while the
5This section is based on Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008), which represents a useful in-
troduction to this literature. A somewhat more technical and in-depth introduction is
represented by Mailath and Samuelson (2006), while Mailath and Samuelson (2013) is a
recent technical survey.
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strategic type is the bad type that may decide to produce high quality to
be confounded by consumers with the good type. In the separation mod-
els, on the other hand, the commitment type is the bad type firm (in fact
it is refereed as the “inept” type) which always produce low quality, while
the strategic type is the good type firm which may decide to produce high
quality good to be distinguished from the inept (bad quality) seller.
Notice that in all models there is a repeated game and hence “what goes
around, comes around”. However, while in hidden action models inadequate
behavior faces retaliatory punishment, in hidden information and mixed mod-
els the trick is done by beliefs: after bad outcomes, consumers update their
beliefs to take into account the higher likelihood that bad quality will persist
and become aware of the firms that sold bad quality (Bar-Isaac and Tadelis,
2008). The outcome (or quality) of today is determined by the seller’s action
or type, but buyer’s beliefs are updated and hence outcomes influence also
future transactions.
In the models of individual reputation, few factors can explain to what
extent reputation can be effective in sustaining efficient trade. First, the
degree of uncertainty about the seller. Then, the speed at which consumers
learn from outcomes, for instance how fast information travels across buyers.
Moreover, the seller’s patience (her discount rate), since the more patient
the seller the more she values the future. And finally, the characteristics of
demand, that make buyers more or less sensitive to reputation.
2.2 Collective reputation
While the contributions on individual reputation are very numerous and still
burgeoning, those on collective reputation are more limited (though increas-
ing). Tirole (1996) is the seminal reference, representing one of the first
contribution to model group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputa-
tions. It is an overlapping generations model, with a matching game, where
each group member’s past quality is observed with noise. There are three
type of agents - honest, dishonest, and opportunistic - and the presence of
the honest type creates incentives for opportunistic to create a reputation.
The general model comes with two variants: one in which the incentive
to sustain the reputation comes from the fear of direct exclusion by the
trading partner, the other from the fear of delegated exclusion, that is of
being excluded from the group, for example by being fired. The model is
quite general, but it is applied in two different settings, to explain corruption
in social groups and quality in firms (a workers’ cooperative).
Different results emerge, but the most interesting is probably that indi-
vidual reputations are determined by collective reputations, and vice versa.
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A member’s incentive to maintain an individual reputation is stronger the
better the group’s reputation. Reputational externalities are long lasting,
and vicious circles may emerge, where new members of an organization may
suffer from the choices of their elders long after the latter are gone. In the
case of firm quality, mass firing (even of honest workers) may be the only
chance to recover from bad reputation. Moreover, increased competition re-
duces individual incentives to sustain reputation and hence can damage firm
reputation.
Winfree and McCluskey (2005) suggest a model where, contrary to Tirole
(1996), the number of firms in the group becomes important and individual
quality is not observable. The collective reputation is based on the group’s
past average quality and it is seen as a common property resource. In ad-
dition, like in other models with hidden action (e.g., Shapiro, 1983), the
consumers observe past quality with a lag.6 In general, it emerges (like with
the case of a common property resource) that with the increase of the number
of members the incentives for each individual to “milk”, i.e., to free-ride, on
the group reputation increases. They consider two possible strategies for the
members: with a minimum quality standard, the group can reduce or avoid
free-riding, while with trigger-strategies individual firms (since their quality
is not traceable) would extract too much from the stock of the collective
reputation.
Some recent papers have looked at the coexistence of private (or individ-
ual) and collective reputations. Landon and Smith (1998) estimate the im-
pact of product quality and reputation on prices and decompose the reputa-
tion impact into individual and collective reputation effects. With a modified
hedonic model, they use data for Bordeaux wines and find that the impact of
reputation on prices is twenty-fold bigger than the impact of current quality,
thus suggesting a major role for reputation in price formation. Moreover,
collective reputation indicators play a significant role in price formation via
their impact on expected quality, and thus affect prices to the extent that
they are good predictors of quality. Overall, they also show that empiri-
cal models that include proxies for individual and collective reputations are
more predictive that either individual-only or collective-only models, thus
justifying the analysis of the dual impact of reputations.
Costanigro et al. (2010) suggest an empirical hedonic model to jointly
analyze product, firm and collective reputations.7 Using data from Califor-
6Beliefs evolve through a pre-specified Markovian process, not with an endogenous
learning of quality like with Bayesian updating.
7Castriota and Delmastro (2010) investigate the determinants of firm reputation taking
into account individual and collective reputation. Using data for Italian wines, they show
the positive effect of firm age, size, investments and collective reputation on individual firm
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nia wines, they disaggregate reputation premia into different quality perfor-
mances, considering not only average quality but also consistency of quality
and name longevity, in a model that nests specific and aggregate names. They
show that both average quality and consistency of quality are improtant.
Moreover, reputation premia decreases as names become more specific, i.e.,
as one goes from collective to individual to product reputations. Last, their
data show that the use of collective reputation is important for inexpen-
sive wines, while in premium wines specific names become more important.
Indeed, they argue that when consumers spend more for wine, the cost of
making a bad choice, i.e., buying a bad quality wine for high price, is higher
and this justifies the higher search costs borne by consumers when switching
from aggregate to specific names.
Costanigro et al. (2012) further elaborate on the coexistence between
private and collective reputations and investigate their dual impact on the
investment in quality by the firms. Their dynamic game model nests Shapiro
(1983) and Winfree and McCluskey (2005) as special cases. They thus have
state transition equations that proxy the evolution of common beliefs: one
set for private reputations, where the updating for the buyer is based on
the discrepancy between current and expected quality, with some exogenous
parameters for the information lag (as in Shapiro, 1983) and for the brand-
visibility. In the equation for collective reputation, the expected quality is
the weighted average of the group quality, with two variants of the model:
one, as in Winfree and McCluskey (2005), where all members have the same
weight,8 and another in which some firms, the “reputational leaders”, may
have a greater weight.
They parametrize the model with Californian wines data and run sim-
ulations. They confirm that quality and reputations increase as consumers
find it easier to learn; however, investment in quality may be inefficiently
low without coordination. Using quantile regression, they also confirm that
private reputations become more valuable the more expensive the wines are.
Last, collective equilibrium reputations increase with the presence of a rep-
utational leader (however, the differences between the coordinated and com-
petitive equilibria increase with the magnitude of the leadership).
Menapace and Moschini (2012) extend the Shapiro’s (1983) model to
investigate the coexistence between collective reputations, in the form of ge-
ographical indications (GIs) that focus on the use of names linked to the
geographic origin of a product, and private trademarks. They consider a
reputation. They also show that in cooperatives membership size decreases reputation.
8In all the models referred so far, quantity is the same for all firms and often normalized
to unity.
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model with an experience good, competitive equilibria, and perfect elastic
supply. Regarding geographical indications (GIs), they compare two institu-
tional settings: the EU sui generis scheme, that is the collective reputations
enforced by the EU (Reg. no. 510/2006), which reveals the region of produc-
tion and specifies some production rules (“cahier des charges”, which they
model as a minimum quality standard), and the US specification marks,
which reveal only the production region (like the American Viticultural Area
or AVA).
They find that individual trademarks and collective GIs are complemen-
tary instruments to signal quality. In addition, they show that GIs decrease
the costs of establishing private reputations. Moreover, the welfare gains
accrue to consumers (in particular those with a taste for higher qualities),
because GIs reduce the costs of building a reputation, also for entrants, and
hence reduce the value of established reputations. Last, while both the EU’s
sui generis GIs model and the US model of certification marks mitigate the
moral hazard problem (by limiting the scope for opportunistic behavior when
revealing some relevant information), the EU model seems better to the ex-
tent that it discloses more information.
All these models of collective reputation are in the pure hidden action
class. One noteworthy exception is the paper by Fishman et al. (2008),
a mixed (hidden action and hidden information) model, where firms know
their quality and the strategic firms are the good quality type, i.e., a model
of separation. Collective branding is modeled as a group of m > 1 firms of
high-quality, marketing together their products under a common brand name,
but still retaining full autonomy regarding business decisions and profits, in
particular deciding individually whether to invest in quality.
In general, the returns on quality investments depend on how well con-
sumers are informed about firm’s past performances: for instance, with word
of mouth communication, the number of consumers who have experienced
the product in the past.9 The critical assumption of Fishman et al. (2008) is
that consumers evaluate a firm’s quality on the basis of their overall experi-
ence with the collective brand and not only on the basis of its individual past
experience. Collective branding thus provides more information because a
consumer can now obtain, for each member of the brand, a number of obser-
vations equal to the number of members in the brand.
They then show that a good brand reputation is more valuable to its
members than a good stand-alone reputation, i.e., this is the reputation effect
9Thus, “the smaller the firm the less informed its customers are about its past quality.
Small firms may therefore be unable to effectively establish individual reputations on their
own and consequently will have little incentive to invest in quality. Here collective branding
may come to the rescue” (Fishman et al., 2008: p. 2).
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of branding. However, there is also a free-riding effect on the other members’
investment, and so the overall effect of the collective branding depends on
the interaction of these two opposing forces. Under perfect monitoring, free-
riding is precluded and cheating, i.e., non-investing, firms are expelled. In
this simple case, the incentive to invest increases monotonically with the
brand size and collective branding leads to higher quality. Without free-
riding, increasing brand size gives more observations to consumers about the
brand type and thus incentives to invest are greater than in a stand-alone
case.
With imperfect monitoring, possibly a more realistic case, in which the
brand is unable to monitor and enforce investment of individual members,
the reputation effect needs to be stronger than the free-riding effect for the
brand to induce more quality investments than the stand-alone firm. This
happens when the group is small and/or the expected quality from investment
is high. Indeed, if the brand is large, the collective brand incentive to invest
is lower than that of the stand-alone firm, because the marginal contribution
of an individual member’s investiment to the brand visibility and reputation
becomes negligible compared to the payoff from free-riding.10
3 Critical choices for collective brands
Since at least the national regulations on AOC, the law has granted the au-
thority to manage the collective reputation to a group of producers sharing
some production techniques in a given area. The group decides on the pro-
duction rules, on their monitoring and enforcement, on who can join or who
should be expelled in case of violations, etc. The collective brand is thus
owned and managed by the group on a democratic basis and the firms can
use the collective brand, alone or together with private labels or brands.
Quite a few of these groups have been facing different kind of choices that
have lead also to difficult decisions. Many citizens are aware of the existence
of these collective groups (e.g., as consumers of some PDOs), but not much is
known about their functioning, except in those few occasions in which news
reach the media. Indeed, in some cases news of conflicts among members or
of controversial choices by either the groups managing the PDO or by some
members that disagree with the majority’s decisions (and that may leave the
PDO) are - possibly strategically - leaked into the media.
10Castriota and Delmastro (2010) find that brand reputation is increasing in the number
of bottles produced but decreasing in the number of producers in the brand.
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3.1 Industry choices
In the cheese sector, for instance, in the Camembert region, there have been
controversies regarding whether to allow for the possibility to use pasteurized
(instead of raw) milk within the production for the Camembert de Normandie
PDO. Pasteurization has been proposed by large firms, in order to solve some
food safety issues related to a particularly resistant bacterium, Listeria. Un-
like many other germs, Listeria can grow in the cold temperatures of the
refrigerator but can be killed by cooking and pasteurization. Defenders of
the staus-quo, in particular small cheese producers, argued that raw milk was
at the origin of the unique features of Camembert de Normandie. Following
the controversy, some producers left the AOC in 2007 and produce Camem-
bert “fabrique´ en Normandie”. However, there have been some lawsuits for
“usurpation de notorie´te´”, which have yet to be settled (Le Du, 2014).11
Similar controversies emerged when Camembert cheese producers were
asked to produce a private label version for a major retailing firm. Some
producers, notably the Cooperative d’Isigny, were in favor, hoping to find a
new market outlet for their products. However, other producers, together
with the Institute National des Appellations d’Origine (INAO), were afraid
that such a choice would “banalize” the Camembert brand (INA, 1997).
Indeed, with the evolution of the retailing sector and the growing impor-
tance of private labels, some PDOs were asked (or were faced with the fait
accompli when some members started) to produce for a retailing’s private la-
bel. The question of whether “blending” the PDO’s (or any collective brand)
reputation with that of the retailer’s private label emerged probably for the
first time with the case “Roquefort Casino”. The regulations of the AOC
Roquefort did not allow retailing firms to produce the cheese, but Casino in
fact was sourcing from a small producer in Roquefort. As it has quite long
been recognized, this tendency of the retailing sector is due to the fact that
“the geographic indications have had the tendency to attract or reassure the
consumer” (ANF, 1998).
But other similar cases concern other EU countries and other agricul-
tural products. One recent example concerns Valpolicella, the second more
important region for red wine production in Italy. Firms in the area produce
different types of red wines, but in the last decades Amarone, a strong and
full bodied type, has been the most valuable wine, fetching prices way above
those for other types of wine coming from the same area and varieties.
Historically, Amarone was produced in well defined hilly areas, considered
better suited to give higher quality grapes. Over the years, however, because
11The court of Rennes was expected to decide on the case in the Fall 2014, after this
article was written.
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of an increasing demand, Amarone production has been expanding to other
areas as well, in particular in the plain valleys, where yields are higher but
quality possibly lower. This “de facto” situation however contrasts with “de
jure” one, that is the rule that allowed Amarone to be produced mainly
in the classical hilly areas. Therefore, the Consorzio di Tutela, i.e., the
body managing the Valpolicella PDO, has recently suggested allowing the
production of Amarone in plain valleys as well (dell’Orefice, 2013b). The
proponents argue that the rule was a typo in the original 1968’s cahier des
charges; in addition, scratching the rule would recognize what is the reality
of production, since a lot of Amarone is already produced in the plain areas
(dell’Orefice, 2013a).
However, many firms, notably those that have heavily invested in the
Amarone production technology and that are also better known worldwide,
are against the modification and argue vehemently that Amarone production
should remain confined in the hilly areas, where quality is higher (Guerrini,
2013a).12 Some of them also threatened to leave the PDO (Guerrini, 2013b).
The 10th of May 2013 the assembly of producers, after an unanimous decision
by the Board of Directors, confirmed by majority the abrogation of the rule.13
3.2 Modelling choices
These cases are far from being unique, but represent probably only the bet-
ter known instances of regional brands facing critical choices. We believe
that most of these different situations of conflicts within the brands share
some common features. There is a group of firms using a regional brand,
i.e., the PDO, and the group is formed by heterogeneous firms. With some
simplification, there may be high quality types and low quality types. There
is a market opportunity that could be jointly seized by the PDO, such as a
new market, the adoption of an innovation that could lead to a cost-saving
technology or to a possible quality improvement (quality vs. tradition?), etc.
To seize this opportunity, however, a decision needs to be taken by the
group, e.g., a change in the cahier des charges. But while some firms are in
12Sandro Boscaini, owner of Masi Agricola, explained that “I’m not convinced that
Valpolicella should be made outside the hills. The Classico region is historically one of
small growers, but the rest is 90% co-ops, and they try to minimise the differences between
the original area and the additional area. I’m not saying thay they can’t make great wine.
But [increasing the size of the AOC] has been a disaster for Valpolicella, driving it down
in quality” (Rand, 2013: 38).
13The decision was probably not a surprise, given that “The voting system, which is
based on grapes production quota, has given an advantage to the bigger producers who
were in favor of the abrogation” (Costanzo, 2013).
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favour of adopting and implementing the changes needed to seize the mar-
ket opportunity, others are against these changes, probably worrying of their
bad effects on the collective reputation. Decisions on rules (and possibly on
their enforcement) may be taken with some democratic process, e.g., using
majority’s voting. Finally, the group decides to seize (or not) the market op-
portunity. In the new equilibrum, new markets may be entered, innovations
adopted, etc., with some member firms benefiting and other possibly losing
out, so that they may even decide to leave the PDO.
3.2.1 Heterogenity
Some of the critical features of these cases are still missing from the reviewed
models. First of all, members of the collective groups are heterogenous. Some
are small, others are big producers, like in the case of the cheese sector. Some
are vertically integrated, e.g., make their own wine, while others deliver their
products to a private or cooperative processing facility. Some are potentially
of higher quality than others, because of location (e.g., hilly vs. plain areas
in some regions), technology adoption, tradition, know-how, etc. Being het-
erogeneous, members may have different incentives and payoffs, which may
explain their positions and decisions.
We believe realistic models should take heterogeneity into account in order
to match predictions with anedoctical evidence. For instance, one would
expect that more homogeneous groups should be less conflict-prone. One
might explain some “bad” equilibria or outcomes not necessarily based on
the size of the group, as suggested by Fishman et al. (2008), but on the
relative importance of bad vs. good types in the group. In fact, a small
group may have problems because it is heterogeneous, notwithstanding its
small size. And vice versa, a relatively big group may still function rather
well because it is homogenous.
Moreover, further investigation on the interaction between private reputa-
tion, collective reputation, and heterogeneity may explain different outcomes
observed in the industry. Some good quality firms may prefer to rely only
on their own reputation (i.e., much better individual than group history)
and hence leave the group (and give up using the regional brand) when the
majority is formed of too conservative or lower quality firms. In Tuscany, for
instance, in the seventies some producers left the Chianti PDO (and their
required Sangiovese plus local varieties blend) to experiment blending with
other international grapes, i.e., Cabernet, Merlot. These experimentations
have led to the production of the so called “Super Tuscan” wines, that ini-
tially could be produced only outside the PDO as table wines. Eventually,
some producers have started a brand-new PDO (e.g., Bolgheri), producing
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wines that have become more famous (and expensive) than the original PDO
ones.
3.2.2 Internal decision-making
While some of the decisions regarding regional and collective brands are
taken by policy-makers, at the EU or national level, many others are left
to the group of producers managing the brand. Usually these groups are
governed with democratic decision-making processes. However, different by-
laws or statutory rules (e.g., whether a group needs a simple or a qualified
majority to modify some rules, or whether voting is proportional to produc-
tion or based on one-head-one-vote), governance structures (e.g., whether in
a big group members can vote directly or by means of elected committees),
group composition (e.g., whether a group is formed by a majority of small
or big producers, or of high or low quality producers), etc. may all influence
outcomes and industry equilibria. For instance, what equilibria emerge may
depend on whether small (or low quality or traditional etc.) producers have
the majority, and to what extent they are free to decide on rules according to
their best interests. In general, ceteris paribus, decisions taken with differ-
ent voting rules or structures may give very different outcomes, and so these
issues should be considered as well.
3.2.3 Tradition vs. innovation
The case of the “Super Tuscan” wines is interesting also because it shows
the dilemma of “tradition vs. innovation”. These experimentations had the
objective of producing wines for long aging, like the better known from Bor-
deaux. Some producers tried with Cabernet and Merlot only, i.e., Sassicaia,
in a terroir that was similar to the Bordeaux sub-region of the Graves. But
in other cases, e.g., Tignanello, producers tried the main local variety, San-
giovese, alone or with a 15% of Cabernet-Sauvignon.
Some of these experimentations were considered valuable and compatible
with the cahier des charges and so later on incorporated into the Chianti rules,
while in other cases producers preferred to continue selling them as table
wines. However, thanks to these innovations it has now become clear that
Sangiovese has a great potential for producing long aging wines, confirming
Barone Ricasoli’s intuition and choices a century later.
3.2.4 Restricted production
Another dimension which may be useful to consider when analyzing collective
reputation is the choice of production levels, in terms of quantity or culti-
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vated area. Most of the papers consider firms that produce only one unit of
production when they decide on the optimal quality level.14 However, it is
well known that different practices may increase yields but impair quality.
In wine production, for example, “if a vine-grower chooses more produc-
tive clones, pruning not correctly, or putting too much fertilizer, quality will
inevitably be compromised” (Johnson and Robinson, 2001).15 Among the
cheese producers of the Bas-Normandie, the critical question recently posed
was, indeed, whether they should be “producing more or producing better?”
(Le Du, 2014).
Many, if not all, regional brands specify also the production area and
producers can benefit from the regional brand only if they belong to that
area, on the claim or presumption that better or recognizable quality comes
with belonging to the restricted area. To our knowledge, the only paper that
does not consider unitary production is the model by Menapace and Moschini
(2012), where they have a perfectly elastic supply. However, they recognize
that some of their results, in particular that the positive welfare effects accrue
to consumers while producers have negligible or negative effects, may change
in a model with restricted land.
Indeed, higher prices translate into higher rents for fixed factors, i.e.,
higher land values. The land value differences for farms either inside or
outside of PDOs areas can be very high, and often the source of conflicts. For
example, in 2007 land values within the Champagne area were up to 50 times
higher than “ordinary” land just outside it. Controversies (even lawsuits)
over the delimitation of production areas have followed. Some producers in
villages located just outside the official Champagne area have argued that
their quality is comparable (if not better) than that of the villages within the
Champagne delimitation (Jefford, 2008).16 We believe it would be interesting
to investigate the effects of different productive levels (or delimitations of
14One notable exception is Fleckinger (2007), which considers a Cournot oligopoly with
endogenously differentiated experience goods where firms compete both on quality and
quantity. The paper considers the case in which consumers know the average quality
offered by a set of producers but not the quality of a given producer, i.e., a situation
intermediate between the polar cases of perfect information and asymmetric information.
It shows that competition increases total marketed quantity, but it decreases quality, and
so it may be harmful to consumers (when the enforceable quality standards are low).
Therefore, quality standards and competition are complementary under a collective name.
Moreover, among one-instrument policies, quantity regulation is the best regulatory tool.
15Probably for these reasons, in many cahiers des charges for PDO wines and cheeses,
there is a limit on the yields per hectare or per cow, or there are other rules, e.g., no corn
silage, that limit yields presumably to increase quality.
16Some commentators in fact argue that extending the Champagne area to other villages
may even lead to an increase in the quality of the production (see, e.g., Jefford, 2008).
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production areas) on reputation and hence on quality.
3.2.5 Reputation-building costs
The costs of reputation-building may have a different impact on firms of
different sizes. It has been shown that larger firms benefit more from private
reputation (Rob and Fishman, 2005). They may indeed find it profitable to
use private brands and so they can rely on (at least) two strategies, that is
on their own individual brand and on the collective one. But for small firms
the problem may be quite different, since a private brand with an individual
reputation may be prohibitely costly to set-up. Sharing the costs of a brand
through a collective endeavour may then become interesting.
Indeed, it has been recognized that PDO regulation “has proved suc-
cessful in allowing even small producers to benefit from a well-established
reputation” (Bureau and Valceschini, 2003). More recent empirical evidence
has confirmed that small firms voluntarily adopting a PDO in the dairy sec-
tor have a higher rate of survival compared to large firms that may benefit
more from economies of scale or own quality brands (Bontemps et al., 2013).
Even though the PDO-effect is less pronounced than the size effect, i.e.,
larger firms have better chances to survive in the industry, it emerges that
the benefit of the PDOs is significant for small firms. Collective reputation
can thus improve the competitiveness of the small agro-food firms. However,
how costs are shared is another issue (see, e.g., Crespi and Marette, 2001).
3.2.6 Value creation in vertical relationships
A successful collective reputation may attract consumers and as such be a
useful tool to retain value in vertical relationships. One recent case, taken
from outside the agricultural sector, is illuminating on the the role and the
effects that collective reputation may have on this regard. A recent TV show
(Dielhenn, 2014) has illustrated the different choices made within the French
“coutellerie artisanal”.
Thiers has a very long tradition in forging blades. There are archeological
reperts showing that this activity was well pursued in the 13th century. In
recent decades, this long tradition, together with the diversification of pro-
duction, has permitted to the many firms in Thiers to provide the majority
of French blades and knives (Barriquand, 2008). In particular, Thiers’ firms
have been the main suppliers of Laguiole for long time. In 1994, local firms
have registered a collective brand, i.e., Le Thiers, managed by the Confre´rie
du Coute´ de Tie´, a group of firms that assign the right to use the brand to
those firms that follow the cahier des charges. When granted this right, a
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firm may put the collective brand logo together with the firm bame on the
blade.
Laguiole cannot claim such a long history - apparently, it all started in
1987, but the real production jump started in 1987 - but on the other hand
it is better known both in France and abroad. “L’abeille de Laguiole” is thus
a better known regional (informal, yet) brand. However, in the last couple of
decades many firms have chosen the low quality end, out-sorcing production
to Asia, while few others, e.g., Forge de Laguiole, have invested in quality,
creating individual brands that try to benefit from the common reputation
and retaining further value by vertically integrating all production phases,
including the forging of blades traditionally outsorced (apparently about 70%
to forges in Thiers) (Parisien, 2013).
To increase value creation, in both areas good quality firms have thus
vertically integrated: in Thiers downstream to produce the other knife com-
ponents to sell not only blades but complete knifes, in Laguiole upstream by
forging their own blades. However, while Thiers has chosen a more coordi-
nated approach to build a collective reputation from a centuries-old know-
how, Laguiole is following an uncoordinated path of different initiatives to
possibly use the better known collective reputation.
Another interesting twist of the dispute between Thiers and Laguiole is
represented by a recent collective attempt of Laguiole firms to obtain the
Indication Ge´ographique Prote´ge´e for their knives. However, French authori-
ties so far have recognized Thiers’ contribution by including both areas in the
definition of the relevant IGP production area, and so protests and lawsuits
have erupted (Depeche (2014)). Following-up on this dispute and comparing
Thiers and Laguiole management strategies of collective branding may help
in understanding how better retain value in vertical chains.
4 What (self?) regulation
Some of these missing elements may be needed for a better understanding
of the controversies and equilibria we observe in the industry, but also to
provide possible support for policy-makers designing regulations. There are
issues over which policy-makers may not intervene, otherwise they would risk
limiting firms’ freedom of enterprise, but some other issues may be investi-
gated since they may provide interesting and useful insights. There are at
least three set of questions that may prove worth pursuing.
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4.1 The questions
4.1.1 Monitoring
First, the choice of the optimal monitoring system of the production and
quality of these collective groups. There may be different solutions to choose
from. Some may be based on private third parties, like the case of anglo-
saxone countries and those used in some labels and conformity certifications.
Others may be based on different public bodies (e.g., in France the INAO,
the Ministry of Agriculture, the Veterinary services and the Directorate for
competition, consumption and frauds all control the PDOs (ANF, 1998); or
they may rely on a unique public body, which may represent either mostly
the producers, the consumers, or the citizens’ health. Finally, in some cases,
even the firms belonging to the PDO may be granted the authority to monitor
the enforcement of the rules by all firms using the brand.17
It may be worth investigating what happens when the monitoring or en-
forcement of the rules is assigned to the firms managing the PDO.18 Should
a different equilibrium be expected compared to a monitoring left to public
bodies? Can we expect different monitoring or enforcement efforts depending
on which type has the majority in the group? One could predict that when a
group is formed mostly by low quality types, because of history and/or bad
choices in the past, the PDO may be stuck in a bad equilibrium outcome,
e.g., lower quality investment levels; in addition, rules may be more laxed,
and/or enforcement/monitoring less strict, because it may become “politi-
cally unsustainable” otherwise. Some good types may prefer to leave the
group or rely almost exclusively on their private brand. On the other hand,
when groups are formed predominantly by good quality types, we may ob-
serve higher reputation (and investment) for quality with possibly a stricter
enforcement of the rules. Low quality types may find these rules quite costly,
still they may choose not to leave the PDO since they benefit from high
collective reputation.19
17This is for instance the case of Italy with the D.Lgs. no. 61/2010.
18Saak (2012), using a model of homogeneous agents, moral hazard and imperfect public
monitoring, considers two other mechanisms to discipline members of collective brands.
The first is represented by social norms (peer punishment), to punish individual shirking
detected through local peer monitoring. The second is represented by food scares, that is
the loss of public confidence in the industry following isolated incidents of low food quality,
which are efficient to the extent that they also scare producers to sustain industry-wide
norms of compliance.
19Results may explain also why it might be better to have monitoring or enforcement
left to third parties, as established for example by the EU with the regs. no. 882/2004/CE,
1234/2007/CE, 607/2009/CE and 1308/2013/UE.
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4.1.2 The optimal “shape” of collective repuations
Another set of questions is on the optimal structure of the system of different
appellations and the relationship between private and collective reputations.
In the wine sector, for instance, all EU appellation systems are based on the
idea of the pyramid : at the base the “vin de table” and the “vin de pays”
(the Table wines of the EU), then the “vin de´limite´ de qualite´ supe´rieure”
and finally the Appellation d’Origine Controˆlle´e, or AOC (the quality wines
produced in specified regions of the EU) at the top of the pyramid. However,
even within this common system, there are different models to look at, both
in France and elsewhere.
Consider the PDO system for the major French wine regions. In Bur-
gundy, within the PDO system there is a hierarchy, which in fact represents
a qualitative classification, of the about 1000 land plots (the climats) avail-
able. The 33 best plots are the Grand Crus, representing around 2-3% of the
production, that are allowed to use only the name of the climat, e.g., Ro-
mane´e.20 The about 500 second-best climats are the Premiers Crus, which
represent less than 20% of the production. They can use the name of the
premier cru and the name of the village where they are located. Then, there
are the appellations at the village level (there are more than 50 and represent
about 30% of wine production).21 Finally, the regional or district appella-
tions, e.g., Bourgogne, which are 22 representing about 50% of lower quality
production, that can use only the regional or district name on the bottle
label. These climats are usually located west of route N74.
In Bordeaux, the famous classification into crus (or growths, from first
to fifth), is based of the 1855 hierarchy which classified chateaux (the wine
producing estates) and not plots. It had mostly estates from the Medoc area
(except for Haute-Brion, from the Graves), and it has remained quite fixed
over the years, with few new entries and some exits. In addition, few other
concurrent classifications (e.g., the St Emillion, the Cru Bourgeois, etc.) have
appeared, some also updated every decades or so, but overall not sharing a
common standard.
Both the Burgundy and the Bordeaux classifications were prepared in
1855, from information coming mostly from wine merchants (but not only)
who reported wine prices that then were probably reflecting the quality of
wines. However, in Burgundy agricultural holdings were very fragmented and
20Using only the name of the grand cru without any other collective name is intended
as a distinctive sign of quality.
21Producers can use the name of the village and possibly the name of the climat but
in smaller letters. Over time, the village denominations have started to add the name of
their most well known cru, using then a two-component hyphenated name.
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the quality of the Pinot Noir wine was very heterogeneous among different
plots. Moreover, the investigation into the determinants of quality and the
mapping of the area had a long tradition. Wine merchants were buying wines
from different Burgundy areas, learned to distinguish the quality of wines
coming from different climats, and so the prices of the grapes were reflecting
the quality potential of different plots. In short, still nowadays “the general
validity of the hierarchy is well supported by the market” (Lewin, 2010).
In Bordeaux, on the other hand, wines were coming from different estates,
not tied to specific plots, and the 1855 classification was a “freeze-frame” of
the prices that different chateaux were fetching in the previous years. How-
ever, wines have changed a lot from the Claret type that was traded in the
first half of the 19th century. In addition, many chateaux have changed their
land compared to the situation in 1855. For these reasons, some commen-
tators believe that the Bordeaux classification system may represent more a
marketing tool, if not “a defiance of reality that can only damage Bordeaux’s
reputation” (Lewin, 2009).
We believe that the Burgundy system, and its ability to accommodate
and integrate the different appellations and hence reputations, is quite in-
teresting. The idea of the pyramidal system, with lower quality wines and
regions at the bottom, is further applied within the PDO. This allows a finer
partition into different degrees of quality, where at the base there are the
regional PDOs and at the top the Grand Crus. These latter can benefit from
the common geographical reputation, probably because consumers can easily
classify the wine tipology, and from their individual recognizability (only the
top performers can use their only appellation) that signals higher quality.
And lower performers can benefit from positive spillovers from the top per-
formers, who made the wine famous in the first place. This system therefore
appears a good way to align incentives and a suitable compromise to avoid
conflicts between individual and collective reputations.
Some recent controversies in the wine industry in Italy seem to provide
arguments to support the idea that the Burgundy system may be better than
a more “horizontal”, i.e., relatively big and homogeneous, one. An illuminat-
ing case is the Chianti Classico PDO, where they recently introduced, not
without discussion among different positions, a top wine tier, called “Grande
selezione”, which represents a category within the appellation purposedly
made for estate-grown wines.22 This seems an indication that further tiers
at the top may be needed to take into account heterogeneity within the ap-
22Notice that the Chianti PDO is already divided into the Chianti Classico zone, formed
by the villages that were first included in the official production area, and the Chianti zone
formed by villages that joined later on.
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pellation. Indeed, in the past few Chianti producers have chosen the lower
category of vin de pays for their top quality wines (Krebiehl, 2013).
4.1.3 Individual reputations: grand cru or domaine?
In principle, a more pronounced “vertical” structure may be more suitable
when quality differences, i.e., heterogenity, are important. However, it is not
clear how to determine and obtain the optimal degree of “verticalization”.
The case of Burgundy, and of other PDOs that have followed suit on that idea,
e.g., the Barolo PDO in Piemonte and its menzioni geografiche aggiuntive,
that is the possibility to add the village and the subarea to the Barolo name
(Rinaldi, 2012), shows that different tiers can be fruitfully accommodated
into a collective (regional) system, where reputations can be shared at the
regional, district, village or even plot level.
Other instances, for example the case of Valpolicella, show on the other
hand that quality differences within the same PDO may be accommodated
through the joint use of collective and private reputations: while the broader
collective reputation may indicate some general aspects of the product, i.e.,
its typology, the private brand may be the market signal that the firm belongs
to a top tier of quality.
The main difference is that establishing a private reputation may require
more costly investments than being in the top tier of a collective one, and
thus such private reputations may be easier to obtain for larger firms. So
the same shape or structure of the collective reputation may induce more
private brands in an industry with larger firms, which seems consistent, for
instance, with the findings of Costanigro et al. ((2010; 2012)) in the case of
the California wine industry.
4.2 Modelling choices
In a stylized model, it may be interesting to investigate the effects of the
possible choices on quality and perceived quality (and hence on reputation),
at the firm and collective level. The contributions we briefly reviewed are a
good starting point to study these different cases, especially when modelling
the interactions between private and collective reputations. In Fishman et al.
(2008) the effect of the collective reputation is mainly based on the group
history and not much is left for firms personal history. In other words, once
belonging to a collective brand, the reputation of a firm depends almost
exclusively on the performances of all the firms in the group. Other papers,
notably Costanigro et al. (2012), consider both group and individual histories,
but need to derive results using simulations.
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To model the interaction between the different layers of reputation, the
idea of the combination of group and individual reputation (past perfor-
mances) might be useful. The question may be whether we can model a
firm’s choices, between “moving out” of the PDO, i.e., establish a private
reputation, or “moving up” within the PDO. Allowing a finer partition of
the PDO, using for example something equivalent to the Grand Cru men-
tion, may induce (good) firms to remain within a particular PDO, especially
the small ones that otherwise would have to sustain the costs of establishing
a private reputation.
To conclude, Fishman et al. (2008) model the collective reputation with
a separation model, since the group of high-quality firms establish the col-
lective brand in order to separate from the low quality firms, i.e., from those
outside the PDO. However, it seems that within the brand itself there are
also instances of imitation, when lower quality firms inside the brand, e.g.,
those using a village appellation, try to benefit from the reputation of higher
quality climats, e.g., Premiere Cru, by extending the village name to include
also the better Cru name as well, as seems to have happened in Burgundy.23
Extending the Fishman et al. (2008) or other approaches to model the dif-
ferent incentives to separate from the lower quality and imitate the higher
one may provide useful insights into these and related problems. In addition,
more theoretical work needs to be done to model the interaction between
collective and individual reputations.
5 Concluding remarks
Coordination of economic activities can be reached with different means, and
one is collective reputation, quite common in agricultural markets. Indeed,
given the demand for differentiated and quality products, the role of the
retailing sector, and the recognition of regional brands by the policy-makers,
in many situations agricultural producers share a brand, while remaining
otherwise autonomus firms.
These collective endeavours allow agricultural producers to be more easily
jointly recognizable, often helping them to reach consumers and sometimes
23In Barolo, for instance, following a lawsuit the firm Marchesi di Barolo was recently
allowed to add the “Cannubi” subarea name to the Barolo name on their wine label.
However, the firm was not strictly from the “Cannubi Cannubi” location, which was the
most well known cru (Rinaldi, 2012). Some commentators fear that the last verdict, which
granted this firm the right to imitate, i.e., to be confounded with, a more recognized cru,
“may only be bad for consumers in the long run, who for the most part won’t know that
Marchesi di Barolo Cannubi’s is from a particular, north-facing parcel of land” (Suckling,
2013) and so not from the better known location (Rinaldi, 2013).
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to obtain better terms of trade within food chains. By spreading costs among
many firms, collective brands are a means to get access to differentiated mar-
kets. Moreover, small firms - that otherwise would have problems establishing
individual reputations - can “democratically” find a venue to niche markets.
Indeed, when well managed, collective brands improve the competitiveness
and the chances of survival for many small firms producing quality products.
However, collective brands are delicate organizations, that may improve
competitiveness but that also face difficult choices ahead. New opportuni-
ties are emerging and will emerge, such as new markets, new technologies,
changes in consumer demand, and new challenges from an ever evolving and
demanding retailing sector. Seizing these opportunities may be seen as vital
in the short-run, especially in periods with low market prices, but entering
new markets or finding new outlets may have a subtle long-run negative
impact on reputation.
We have discussed some of the problems that collective brands have to
face if they want to seize market opportunities. With some collective brands,
quality is often associated with traditional practices, and innovation is seen
thus as a threat to these traditions. However, innovation can also bring
forward better ways to interpret and enhance the value of the same traditions,
and so banning innovation tout-court may make everyone worse-off. When
choice is possible, it is probably better to share the collective reputation
with similar firms, for instance by scientifically zoning the terroir. However,
since this may imply restricting the production area, it may increase not only
incentives to invest in quality but also rents for the included firms, to the
detriment of other firms and consumers and an ensuing increase in conflicts
between the brand and outside stake-holders.
On the other hand, when the group of producers within the collective
brand is heterogenous, conflicts emerge inside the group, as seen in the me-
dia. To align incentives among heterogeneous members, some brand con-
figurations seem better fitting than others, but their suitability to different
situations may need to be analyzed with a case-by-case approach. Whether
to take into account heterogenity by a more vertically partitioned collective
brand, e.g., the Burgundy’s example, or with the interaction between the
collective and private reputations, may depend on the industry structure at
hand. With small firms, a more differentiated collective brand may be a
good system to align all firms’ incentives; on the other hand, in an industry
with larger firms, private brands may naturally emerge as complements to
collective brands.
The retailing sector, increasingly more concentrated, is also more demand-
ing on upstream firms, thus asking for (but also providing) better services to
consumers. Many collective brands may face difficult choices when requested,
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for instance, to supply their product for the retailer’s private label. Whether
seizing these new market opportunities is a good choice may depend on the
overall effect on the consumer’s perception of the collective brand, that is on
the effect on collective reputation.
There are no easy-to-give answers or one single recipe to suggest for op-
timally behaving and reacting to evolving market and retailing needs. There
are different issues to take into account and often multiple tools that can be
used. Some cases were discussed, highlighting some common features that
seem to be missing or not enough investigated in existing economic models.
The aim should be the design of the optimal collective brand configuration to
align different incentives and to reach an efficienct and equitable compromise
among the different actors in the food chains. Problems are more complex
when firms are heterogeneous, but good practices exist and, together with
the lessons from bad experiences, they can be used to make informed choices
by the industry and the policy-makers.
These problems are important for the food industry, but also interesting
for economists, and in this paper we have provided some suggestions for fu-
ture research, both for understading industry and market equilibria and for
supporting better informed policy-making. Policy-makers have so far recog-
nised these collective endeavours in the agricultural sector. Good regulations
may protect useful institutions or organizations, but they cannot isolate them
from a changing world. To avoid being accused of unfairly protecting some
firms, sectors, or parts of the world24 without an agreed-upon and shared ra-
tionale, economists may help by investigating how collective reputations may
assure quality products, better incomes for producers, but reasonable prices
for consumers. We believe that the tools of the economics of reputation may
help in exploring these and related issues.
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